

Annex 1- Illegal Deforestation

Introduction

This annex synthesises existing evidence on illegal deforestation, including some commentary on the robustness of this evidence. It also describes some of the key costs that result from illegal deforestation.

The annex considers broad limitations associated with data on illegal deforestation before presenting global estimates of deforestation drawing on recent Forest Trends reports. Regional data on illegal deforestation is then outlined, highlighting specific statistics for key countries responsible for a significant proportion of global rates of tropical forest loss. A series of case studies are then examined to outline recent evidence for illegal deforestation at the country level. Finally, the annex examines some of the primary impacts of illegal deforestation, before concluding with a summary of the key points covered in this document.

Limitations

Illegal deforestation is by its very nature a clandestine activity that presents difficulties for those looking to estimate the extent to which it persists. It is also extremely difficult to directly link the demand for forest risk commodities in specific countries to illegal deforestation. As noted above, this means that for some developing countries, such as those in Africa, much evidence that exists is anecdotal and difficult to attribute directly to illegal activities.

It is also the case that the most recent estimates of *global* deforestation are based on data from 2000–2009. This decreases our confidence in the robustness of global estimates, but recent quantitative estimates, particularly within Brazil and Indonesia, confirm that illegal deforestation is still a pressing concern. Anecdotal evidence from other developing countries also points towards this conclusion.

Brazil's data within the 2014 Forest Trends report¹ must be treated with care, since a legal change in 2012 provided amnesty for around half of the illegal forest conversion that had occurred prior to 2008. The additional consideration of data presented in the 2021 Forest Trends report², helps to allay some of these concerns.

Global Estimates:

¹ [for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

² [Illicit-Harvest-Complicit-Goods_rev.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

1. There are very few attempts to estimate the extent of illegal deforestation globally. However, a key resource for global illegality estimates is a 2014 report conducted by forest conservation group Forest Trends (supported by UK Aid)³.
2. This 2014 report found that **49% of tropical deforestation between 2000 - 2012 was due to illegal conversion** for commercial agriculture. There was a wide range of uncertainty for this value (between 36% and 65%), because considerable assumptions are made about countries with poor data.
3. A more recent Forest Trends publication estimated that **60% of tropical forest loss between 2013 and 2019 was driven by commercial agricultural expansion**, with 69% of this conducted in violation of national laws and regulations⁴.
4. **Half of agricultural commodities grown on illegally deforested land are consumed domestically, while the rest are exported.** This equated to almost 21 million hectares of illegally cleared tropical forest exported between 2000–2012⁵. This is supported by further evidence; a 2019 study, focussing on deforestation resulting from all agricultural commodities in all tropical countries in the period 2010–2014, found that depending on the trade model used, 29–39% of deforestation-related emissions were driven by international trade⁶. Furthermore, a 2015 study that considered the deforestation and carbon emissions associated with four key forest risk commodities (palm oil, soy, beef and wood products) across seven countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea), found that just over a third was embodied in exports between 2000–2011⁷. **Evidence suggests that international demand for forest risk commodities, including from the UK, plays a significant role in driving the production of illegally grown commodities.**
5. The 2021 Forest Trends report estimates that **Brazil and Indonesia alone accounted for 59% of all reported global agro-conversion between 2013 and 2019** (39% and 20% respectively)⁸.

Regional and National Estimates:

Region	Proportion of forest loss across tropics	Extent of regional forest loss (Mha)	Extent of forest loss due to commercial agriculture (Mha)	Proportion of agro-conversion related production exported
Latin America & Caribbean	44%	33.9	26	24%

³ [for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

⁴ [Illicit-Harvest-Complicit-Goods_rev.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

⁵ [for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

⁶ [Agricultural and forestry trade drives large share of tropical deforestation emissions - ScienceDirect](#)

⁷ [Trading forests: land-use change and carbon emissions embodied in production and exports of forest-risk commodities - IOPscience](#)

⁸ [Illicit-Harvest-Complicit-Goods_rev.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

Asia-Pacific	31%	23.7	18	42%
Africa	25%	19.3	10	26%

Table 1 Summary of regional tropical deforestation data 2013-19 from Forest Trends⁹.

Latin America and the Caribbean

6. Between 2013 and 2019, 44% of all forest loss across the tropics, 33.9 Mha, occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)¹⁰.
7. According to the latest Forest Trends Report¹¹, between 2013 and 2019, commercial agriculture in LAC was:
 - a. Likely responsible for deforestation of an area of 26 Mha.
 - b. At least **22.88 Mha (88%) of which was likely in violation of local laws and regulations governing forest clearing.**
 - c. 24% of the production linked to this agro-conversion was exported; there is therefore a risk that **international buyers are linked to the loss of 6.2 Mha of forest and potentially to illegal deforestation.**
8. **Brazil was responsible for approximately 60% of tropical forest loss across the LAC** region between 2013 and 2019. This equates to 20.4 Mha¹².
9. Earlier Forest Trends data provides evidence that between 2000–2012, an estimated **two-thirds of illegal agro-conversion took place in Latin America**¹³. In Brazil, the estimate for deforestation due to illegal agro-conversion was 71%, with **21% of this (6.5 million hectares) being exported.** In Brazil, when looking at agro-conversion for just cattle and soy, the Forest Trends report found that at least 90% of Amazonia deforestation was illegal compared to 71% for all types of agro-conversion.
10. A 2019 study analysing deforestation alerts (a system to monitor deforestation) in Brazil indicated that 96% of deforestation during the year-long study period was illegal¹⁴. The moderately lower figure in the Forest Trend's report is partially expected due to the underestimate of non-compliance report and difference in study years.
11. Government of Brazil statistics are indicative of increasing rates of primary forest loss¹⁵. Recent data from Brazil's National Institute for Space Research showed between August 2018 and July 2019, 976,200 hectares of deforestation took place (a 30% increase over the preceding period)¹⁶.
12. Further evidence supports this data. A 2020 report by Trase (a research initiative between Global Canopy & Stockholm Environment Institute), found that between 2012 and 2017 **in Matto Grosso, Brazil's third largest state and largest soy exporter, 27% of deforestation took place on soy farms.**

⁹ [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](https://www.forest-trends.org/)

¹⁰ [Ibid.](#)

¹¹ [Ibid.](#)

¹² [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](https://www.forest-trends.org/)

¹³ [for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](https://www.forest-trends.org/for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf)

¹⁴ <https://s3.amazonaws.com/alerta.mapbiomas.org/relatorios/MBI-deforestation-report-2019-en-final5.pdf>

¹⁵ <http://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/amazon/increments>

¹⁶ <https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/11/brazil-s-deforestation-exploding-and-2020-will-be-worse>

Of this, 95% was deemed illegal¹⁷. Among the 15 municipalities in the state, the report found that most of the soybeans exported went to large companies, with 60% of their total harvest bought by just two firms. This is compounded by further evidence that suggests 62% of all potentially illegal deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes occurs on just 2% of the properties¹⁸.

13. **A further 2020 paper estimated that 20% of soy exports and at least 17% of beef exports to the EU from the Amazon and Cerrado biomes, may be contaminated with illegal deforestation**¹⁹. It defines contamination as illegal deforestation having occurred during the process of producing the products.

Asia-Pacific

The majority of illegal agro-conversion outside of LAC took place in Asia, largely in Indonesia which accounted for almost half of all tropical forest loss across Asia between 2013 and 2019²⁰.

14. **Between 2013 and 2019 31% of all forest loss across the tropics, 23.7Mha, occurred in the Asia-Pacific region**²¹.

15. According to Forest Trends data²², between 2013 and 2019 commercial agriculture was:

- a. responsible for the clearance of more than 18 Mha of forest.
- b. at least 41% of which was likely in violation of local laws and regulations governing forest clearing.
- c. 42% of the production linked to the agro-conversion was likely for export; there is therefore a risk that **international buyers are linked to the loss of 7.6Mha of forest and potentially to illegal deforestation**.

16. In Indonesia, the central estimate for deforestation due to illegal agro-conversion was 64%, with 48% of this (7.4 million hectares) intended for export²³. More recent analyses support this. For example, it is estimated that the export of global palm oil is dominated by illegally grown oil palm (80–87%), and that an estimated 90% of oil palm plantations in Kalimantan derive directly from formerly forested area^{24,25,26}.

17. Updated Forest Trend **statistics for the period 2013-19 show that Indonesia was responsible for 14% of all forest loss across the tropics over this period**, and that 89% of this forest loss was driven by commercial agriculture²⁷.

Africa

¹⁷ https://www.globalcanopy.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/TraselIssueBrief4_EN.pdf

¹⁸ https://a3veen.home.xs4all.nl/Publiek/10.1126@science.aba6646_ontbossing.pdf

¹⁹ https://a3veen.home.xs4all.nl/Publiek/10.1126@science.aba6646_ontbossing.pdf

²⁰ [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](https://forest-trends.org/Illicit-Harvest-Complicit-Goods)

²¹ [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](https://forest-trends.org/Illicit-Harvest-Complicit-Goods)

²² [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](https://forest-trends.org/Illicit-Harvest-Complicit-Goods)

²³ [for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](https://forest-trends.org/for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf)

²⁴ <https://rightsanddeforestation.org/resources/consumer-goods-and-deforestation-an-analysis-of-the-extent-and-nature-of-illegality-in-forest-conversion-for-agriculture-and-timber-plantations/>

²⁵ <https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1702>

²⁶ <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S0278-120420150000034004/full/html>

²⁷ [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](https://forest-trends.org/Illicit-Harvest-Complicit-Goods)

18. **Between 2013 and 2019 25% of all forest loss across the tropics, 19.3 Mha, occurred in Africa**²⁸. Commercial agriculture is not, however, the main driver of forest loss in Africa.
19. According to Forest Trends data²⁹, between 2013 and 2019 commercial agriculture was:
- responsible for 10% of this forest loss.
 - at least 66% of which was likely in violation of local laws and regulations governing forest clearing.
 - 26% of the production linked to this agro-conversion was likely for export; there is therefore a risk that **international buyers are linked to the loss of 0.5Mha of forest and potentially to illegal deforestation**.
20. Estimates for the extent of illegal deforestation for some developing countries, particularly in Africa, are based for the most part on anecdotal evidence. For example, a World Resources Institute (WRI) report in 2018 estimated that in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire there were 60% and 26% rises, respectively, in primary forest loss between 2017 and 2018³⁰. It is thought that much of these increases result from illegal mining and expansion of cocoa farms, but the report notes that attributing the exact cause of forest loss is difficult. It also notes that in these two countries, 70% of the loss occurred in protected areas. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, primary forest loss was 38% higher in 2018 compared to the average yearly estimates from 2011 to 2017. Much of this was from expansion of small-scale forest clearing for agriculture and fuelwood.
21. Forest Trends estimate that **deforestation in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 2013 and 2019 accounted for 11% of all tropical forest loss (8.1Mha)**³¹. Subsistence agriculture has been identified overwhelmingly as the main driver of this forest loss, accounting for 99% of all deforestation in 2019³².

Case Studies

A series of case studies are outlined below to demonstrate additional recent evidence for illegal deforestation across different countries globally. It is important that case studies are considered as part of any analysis into illegal deforestation because quantitative data is not always available. These are all taken from the 2014 The Forest Trends report³³.

Table 2, below, summarises national 2000-2012 deforestation data³⁴ and links these to the case studies that follow.

²⁸ [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

²⁹ [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

³⁰ [The World Lost a Belgium-sized Area of Primary Rainforests Last Year | World Resources Institute \(wri.org\)](#)

³¹ [Illicit Harvest, Complicit Goods - Forest Trends \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

³² [Democratic Republic of the Congo Deforestation Rates & Statistics | GFW \(globalforestwatch.org\)](#)

³³ [for168-consumer-goods-and-deforestation-letter-14-0916-hr-no-crops_web-pdf.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

³⁴ Ibid.

Country	Deforestation due to commercial agriculture 2000-12	Deforestation for commercial agriculture which was illegal 2000-12	Illegal commercial agriculture deforestation embodied in exports 2000-12	Case study	Sector
Brazil	90%	68-90%	30%	Cattle Ranching in Marabá	Beef
Indonesia	80%	80%	75%	Oil palm in Central Kalimantan	Palm Oil
PNG	10%	90%	100%	Independent Timber & Stevedoring	Timber
Cambodia	40-80%	90%	0-72-100%	Hoang Anh Gai Lai Rubber Plantation	Rubber
Tanzania	0-35-53%	0-42-85.8%	0-51-77%	Bioshape Jatropha Plantation	Biofuel
Cameroon	No data	No data	No data	Herakles Oil Palm Plantation	Palm Oil

Table 2 Table summarising relevant case studies and the role of commercial agriculture and export markets in driving national deforestation rates 2000-2012

Cattle Ranching in Marabá, Pará, Brazil:

22. In March 2007, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) approved a loan to Brazilian company Bertín, for the expansion of a slaughterhouse in Marabá, Pará. Before the investment was made, IFC's own summary found that "numerous farmers in Bertín's supply chain have no legal title to land or have fraudulent documentation", and so the loan included conditions meant to minimize impact on the surrounding land and to prevent the use of illegally deforested land. Greenpeace found that in the six ranches supplying cattle they had researched, all had deforested much more than the legal reserve maximum of 20%. All had deforested at least 60%, and two had cleared at least 90%. Because of this, deforestation rates of the surrounding area were estimated to have increased by 40%.

- % of 2000 to 2012 deforestation due to commercial agriculture: 90%
- % of 2000 to 2012 deforestation for commercial agriculture which was illegal: 68%–90%
- % of 2000 to 2012 illegal commercial agriculture deforestation embodied in exports: 30%

PT Suryamas Cipta Perkasa (PT SCP; a Subsidiary of PT BEST Group) Oil Palm Plantation:

23. In 2012, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak (a national civil society organization) published their findings from investigations into one oil palm concession in the Pulang Pisau district of Central Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo. The investigation showed that the plantation business

permit (IUP) had been illegally issued without the required Environmental Impact Assessment having been approved. The company was also shown to have breached several regulations while clear-felling the forest between 2007 and 2010. Numerous fire “hotspots” that were found within the concession during the period when the forest was being converted also suggest that the company failed to mitigate the risk of fire during land clearing and failed to deploy firefighting to extinguish any fires.

24. Another company within the PT BEST group had previously been found to have illegally cleared 2,500 hectares of forest within Tanjung Puting National Park. EIA and Telapak provided evidence to the authorities, but there was little to no meaningful action taken. Thus, the case also raised major concerns over the capacity to enforce laws related to oil palm development.

- **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation due to commercial agriculture: 80%**
- **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation for commercial agriculture which was illegal: 80%**
- **% of 2000 to 2012 illegal commercial agriculture deforestation embodied in exports: 75%**

Independent Timber & Stevedoring (PNG) Ltd, Papua New Guinea:

25. Initially this was a project to build a road, encompassing just 2,400 hectares of forest, which subsequently ballooned in size to cover more than 2 million hectares. If the project’s goals had been fully realised, it would have been the largest tropical logging project in the world and could potentially have doubled global tropical timber production and exports. The Parliamentary Commission found that the legally required consultation with local landowners was inadequate, and the leases were based on counterfeit land registration. The Provisional Lands Officer who approved the leases claimed that he had been misled by IT&S about what he was signing. In July 2014, three SABL licenses covering 1.25 million hectares of the IT&S project were ordered to be cancelled, following the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry.

- **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation due to commercial agriculture: 10%**
- **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation for commercial agriculture which was illegal: 90%**
- **% of 2000 to 2012 illegal commercial agriculture deforestation embodied in exports: 100%**

Hoang Anh Gai Lai (HAGL) Rubber Plantation, Cambodia:

26. An investigation by the Global Witness, published in May 2013, provides evidence of a range of illegalities relating to Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) issued to the Vietnamese company Hoang Anh Gai Lai (HAGL) in Cambodia. The company was issued ELCs covering almost 50,000 hectares, five times the maximum allowed under Cambodian law. Furthermore, official

documents show that 28,000 hectares of these concessions were issued for areas of forest inside a Wildlife Sanctuary and National Park. Intact forest was illegally cleared in a breach of the concession contract, as well as rosewood and other protected timber species being harvested.

27. In June 2013, after the Global Witness report was published, HAGL committed to implement a four-month freeze on all clearing and planting on its concessions, and to discuss with and address the issues faced by local people. However, these commitments were not fulfilled. In April 2014 HAGL again declared that it had suspended forest clearing at three of its seven rubber plantations in Cambodia, this time following a request from the IFC. The IFC, which had been helping fund the developments, acted in response to a formal complaint filed by local communities alleging that HAGL had breached IFC lending safeguards by breaking Cambodian laws. IFC has since begun a dispute resolution process between the company and the local community.
 28. The agribusiness company pledged in 2015 to return land within its rubber concessions to local communities. But as residents have sheltered at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the company has reportedly cleared much of the land, bulldozing sacred sites known as spirit mountains, burial grounds, traditional hunting areas, wetlands and old-growth forests. According to some human rights lawyers, land concessions in Cambodia have displaced around 770,000 people since the early 2000s³⁵.
- **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation due to commercial agriculture: 40%–80%**
 - **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation for commercial agriculture which was illegal: 90%**
 - **% of 2000 to 2012 illegal commercial agriculture deforestation embodied in exports: 0%–72%–100%**

Bioshape Jatropha Plantation, Tanzania:

29. One of the largest planned agricultural plantation projects in Tanzania in recent years was a 34-80,000 hectares jatropha plantation to be developed by Dutch company Bioshape in an area of East African Coastal Forest. In 2009 the NGO Resource Extraction Monitoring (REM), worked with the Tanzanian authorities to examine the legality of the development. REM noted that Bioshape had the largest and busiest sawmill in Southern Tanzania at the time and calculated that, if the entire plantation area was developed, the company was likely to become the largest logging company in the country. Rights to the land were obtained from the villagers to the government and then given to the company. It was noted that the villagers were not aware of the full implications of what they had signed along with key terms not matching what they had agreed. The Bioshape plantation never came to fruition and after its energy-company

³⁵ <https://www.aseantoday.com/2020/05/vietnamese-rubber-firm-breaks-pledge-to-world-bank-clears-indigenous-land-in-cambodia/>

backers pulled out, Bioshape went bankrupt in June 2010. The villages affected remain barred from the land, and never saw the benefits they were promised.

- **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation due to commercial agriculture: 0%–35%–53%**
- **% of 2000 to 2012 deforestation for commercial agriculture which was illegal: 0%–42%–85.8%**
- **% of 2000 to 2012 illegal commercial agriculture deforestation embodied in exports: 0%–51%–77%**

Herakles Oil Palm Plantation, Cameroon:

30. In 2009, the Cameroonian government issued a lease for an oil palm plantation covering 73,000 hectares in the southwest of the country. The lease was issued to Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC), now owned by US company Herakles Farms. The area given was found to contain chimpanzees, forest elephants and many other threatened species. Herakles planned to plant 60,000 hectares of oil palm over four years, and evidence of illegality has come to light since 2011 when they broke ground. In February 2012, the company began clear-felling before receiving its environmental permit. In May of the same year, they were issued a US\$48,000 fine for clearing a forest not yet excised from the Permanent Forest Estate. Le Centre pour le Développement et l'Environnement (CED) also claims that the lease issued is a breach of the law since it did not receive the required presidential approval.
31. While operations were supposedly suspended in 2013 by the Cameroonian government, Greenpeace has documented log markings suggesting that operations continued after this period. It was also alleged that the issuance of the permit was a violation of Cameroon's forestry legislation due to it not being awarded through competitive public auction as is required.

Impacts of illegal deforestation:

32. The data presented above provides clear evidence of the role of commercial agriculture in driving illegal tropical deforestation. Illegal deforestation has a range of significant and well documented negative impacts both on the country in which it takes place, and on trade partners^{36,37}. These include:
 - Degradation of valuable forest stands threatening biodiversity, including rare and endangered species
 - Increased soil erosion and landslides
 - Increased CO² release and resultant climatic changes
 - Human rights abuses and violation of the basic needs and rights of local communities and their culture
 - Corruption, crime, coercion, and money laundering

³⁶ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/244059467_Socio-economic_environmental_and_governance_impacts_of_illegal_logging

³⁷ [Consumer-Legality-Brief-FINAL-WEB.pdf \(forest-trends.org\)](#)

- Reduction of royalties, taxes, and other charges paid by logging companies to producer States
 - Depreciation of legal activities due to unfair competition
 - Price distortions in countries importing forest risk commodities
 - Reduced competitiveness of suppliers of legal and sustainable commodities
 - Risk of trade sanctions or non-trade barriers where countries impose limits of imports of goods which may be driving illegal deforestation.
33. It has been estimated that illegal deforestation generates economic losses in tropical countries of more than US\$17 billion per year³⁸. These losses result from financial impacts (mostly lost revenue through taxes and reduced investment), natural capital loss (through removal of ecosystem services), loss of social/human capital (for example, ignored peoples' rights of ownership of the land and the forests they contain) and loss of political capital (loss of trust and subsequent investment).
34. Just considering Indonesia, these costs have been valued at more than US\$4.9 billion per year over the 2000-2012 period, excluding the impact of forest and peat fires on economic activity and human health. In 2015, it is estimated that forest fires in Indonesia (which are exacerbated by deforestation) cost Indonesia as much as US\$16 billion³⁹. In contrast, between 2004 and 2019, Brazil prevented as much as US\$8.4 billion per year in previous losses by reducing illegal forest clearing for soya plantations and cattle pastures after its peak in 2004⁴⁰.
35. Since illegally, unsustainably or irresponsibly produced commodities are generally cheaper than commodities produced more sustainably or legally, their presence on the market can drag prices down and reduce competitiveness of suppliers of legal or sustainable commodities. A 2004 study estimated that world timber prices had been depressed by between 7 and 16% (depending on product) by the prevalence of illegal products in the market, losing US timber firms at least US\$460 million each year in forgone sales^{41,42}.

Summary:

36. The evidence presented in this annex gives significant insight into the effects of illegal deforestation and the role of commercial agricultural expansion in driving tropical forest loss.
37. Despite the challenges associated with assessing and quantifying rates and impacts of illegal deforestation, data showcased in the research cited here

³⁸ https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Info-Brief-Costs-of-Illegal-Agro-Conversion_Final.pdf

³⁹ <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/643781465442350600/Indonesia-forest-fire-notes.pdf>

⁴⁰ https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Info-Brief-Costs-of-Illegal-Agro-Conversion_Final.pdf

⁴¹ <https://grist.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/afandpa.pdf>

⁴² <https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Consumer-Legality-Brief-FINAL-WEB.pdf>

builds a strong picture of the challenge and a robust case for the need for strengthened Due Diligence in supply chains.

38. The role of several countries has been highlighted as being of particular significance in driving tropical forest loss. Brazil and Indonesia have been identified as the main contributors to deforestation across the tropics, driven by the markets for beef and soybeans and palm oil respectively.
39. Just three countries (Brazil, Indonesia, DRC) were reportedly responsible for 51% of all tropical forest loss between 2013 and 2019. However, it remains critical to address the challenge of agriculture as a driver of tropical forest loss in the countries responsible for the remaining 49%.
40. The economic, social, environmental and political impacts of tropical forest loss are clear. Urgent and effective action is needed to address the role of global demand for forest risk commodities in driving tropical deforestation.

26/11/21